A child thinks that hell is a real place in the middle of the earth. You do not agree. This is a case where you disagree with someone you recognize as your epistemic subordinate in the question of whether ” (B) is true. They think Babe Ruth was the greatest baseball player of all time. We learn that a sports writer, who has written several books on the history of baseball, disagrees and says that somehow it was the greatest. In this case, you will notice that you do not agree with an epistemic superior in this matter, because you know that you are only an amateur when it comes to baseball. In a third case, you do not agree with your sister about the name of the city that visited your family on vacation when you were a child. You know from long experience that your memory in cases like this is about as reliable as you; it is a disagreement with a recognized epistemic peer. Kelly (2005) argues that while 3 evidence is for 2, this is not evidence for 1. If 3 is not proof of 1, learning 3 (by discovering the disagreement of colleagues) does not provide relevant evidence for the sentence at issue.
If learning to disagree does not affect the opinion of peers on its own evidence that is relevant to the proposal at issue, then such a discovery, for which the doxastic attitude for peers is justified, does not change anything. From this point of view, the discovery of differences between the others makes no difference to what you should believe about the controversial proposal. Like the Justificationist view, the view of the overall evidence lies somewhere between the Steadfast view and the view of equality. Total Evidence View states that if you disagree with your peers, you have the right to believe, as evidenced by the overall evidence (Kelly 2010). While this may seem like a myth, the opinion is centered on an additional assertion about the relationship between first-rate evidence and higher-order evidence. First, let`s look again at the “same steep slope” view. From the point of view of equality, in a peer disagreement, in which one person has a 0.7 degree of belief that ,(P) and the other has a 0.3 degree of belief that ” (P), both peers must share the difference and take a 0.5 degree of belief that . (P.”